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EDITORIAL COMMENT
CRIMINOLOGY IN THE LAW SCHOOLS.
Is it not time that our law schools should begin to demand some
training in criminology from their students? If it is desirable that our
criminal law should be made scientific, our experts in criminal law must
receive scientific training. It is practically universally acknowledged that
the problem of crime is primarily a scientific problem-that is, it is
amenable to analysis and solution by scientific methods. Nevertheless,
so far as we know, students in criminal law in no school in the United
States are as yet required to take a preliminary course in scientific criminology. Put bluntly, this means that our students in criminal law are
introduced to the subject usually from a- non-scientific standpoint, the
standpoint of precedent and tradition. It can hhrdly be expected, therefore, that, later, such students will readily acquire the scientific point of
view in dealing with crime and the criminal.
It may be objected that we are not ready to introduce criminology
into our law schools, or even in pre-legal courses, because the science is
as yet in such an unsettled condition; but it must be replied that this
unsettled condition of the science exists more largely in the minds of
those who are ignorant of the scientific work which has been accomplished
along criminological lines than it exists in the actual state of the science
itself. The work of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology is largely to render accessible the consensus of the best scientific
opinion in criminology and to bring this consensus to bear upon the
actual problems of our criminal law. Through its translations the Institute is preparing a series of texts which may be made use of in courses
in criminology, and there can scarcely be any doubt but that already a
sufficient number of adequately equipped teachers exist in this country
to give such instruction, provided law schools were at all interested in
discovering them.
Closely connected with the necessity of some training in criminology
for all students of criminal law is the matter of special training for our
criminal judges. The judge of the criminal court ought to be an expert
in criminal law and criminology, which is very rarely the case in this
country. Special courses of training should be given by our law schools
as preparation for this work. All of this, of course, implies that our
criminal courts can never be properly organized as long as we retain the
method of popular election to determine who shall be at-their head, or the
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still more objectionable practice of having the same individual serve as a
judge in both civil and criminal courts. Such practices ought not to be
tolerated among an enlightened people. Criminal judges should manifestly be appointed upon the basis of competitive examinations, which
should emphasize criminology and criminal law, and their work should
be entirely separate from the civil courts.
C. A. E.
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CONNECTICUT.

The Bridgeport (Conn.) Post, commenting on the Lawson-Keedy
report on English procedure, declares with evident pride that none of
their recommendations are entirely foreign to Connecticut procedure.
Objections to indictments, it says, are rarely ever made in Connecticut.
The examination of jurors on their voir dire is nearly always limited to
the asking of questions intended merely to show incompetency or bias.
Accused persons unable to employ counsel are furnished legal assistance,
both in the superior court and (by a recent act) in the court of common
pleas. It has been many years, we are told, since the Supreme Court
granted a new trial on a technicality. In many cases prosecuting attorneys follow the English rule of non-partisanship and make only impartial presentations of the evidence to the jury. The fee system of compensating prosecuting attorneys does not prevail in the case of the
higher prosecuting officers, though, unfortunately, it is still recognized
as a means of compensating prosecutors in the minor courts. In recent
years there has been less of a tendency among the lawyers, we are also
told, to inject error into the record and more of a disposition to confine
their endeavors to disproving guilt. Finally, the goal to which Connecticut is steadily moving is the investment of the trial judge with
larger powers in the conduct of trials, as is the practice in England.
We are glad to have the truth of these statements confirmed by a member of the New Haven bar, who says there is now very little cause of
complaint with Connecticut criminal justice. "Mlistrials and the discharge of criminals notably guilty on technical grounds is," our infermant says, "almost, if not quite, unknown to our experience. Appeals to our court of last resort in criminal cases are comparatively few
and convictions are never reversed except for very grave reasons." Our
informant attributes much of this happy condition in Connecticut to the
fact that the judges and prosecuting attorneys are not elective, the
latter being appointed by the judges of the superior court, and are
usually retained in office until they are promoted to the bench or until
they retire from practice. A second reason advanced for the satisfactory
conditions described above is the absence of a penal code or code of pro-
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cedure. The entire body of penal law and procedure in Connecticut is
embodied in eighty pages of only 453 sections. Connecticut is to be congratulated on this showing, and other states might well follow her example.
5. W. G.
A BILL TO LIMIT THE POWERS OF TRIAL JUDGES.
There is a bill pending before the Pennsylvania legislature, now in
session, in regard to jury trials, which it is to be hoped will not be.
enacted. This bill provides that in any jury trial "the trial court, in
charging the jury, shall limit its said charge to the law applicable to or
controlling the issue joined, without any criticism or discussion of the
testimony produced at said trial."
The common law rule that the trial judge, in charging the jury, may
comment on the evidence, may express an opinion as to the weight of the
evidence, or any part of it, provided he does not give binding instructions
and leaves the jury free to determine the questions of fact, has always
prevailed in Pennsylvania. This is the present practice in England.
Profs. Lawson and Keedy, in their report on "Criminal Procedure in
England," in the January number of this JoumTAL, say: "After counsel have addressed the jury the judge reviews the evidence in detail, and
directs the jury as to the law governing the facts. In this summing
up the judge generally expresses his opinion regarding the weight and
importance of the evidence. This has always been regarded as a very
important function of an English judge." This important judicial
function has been preserved in the federal courts and in some of the
state courts, although it has, unfortunately, been much limited or abolished in many of the states. It is certainly a valuable function and of
great aid to the jury, especially in cases with complicated facts and
much testimony. Our loose systems of pleading multiply subsidiary
questions of fact in most cases and render necessary a large amount of
evidence. The summary of the testimony by the trial judge and the
directing of their attention to the salient points and as to where the
weight of evidence lies are important elements of the trial by jury. In
states where constitutional or statutory limitations have been placed
on this power of the judges it is believed that experience has universally
shown that such changes were unwise and detrimental. They are being
severely criticized, especially of late, in all states where they exist.
In Pennsylvania a long line of cases lay down the rule that it is
the duty of the court to comment on the testimony and that it is not
only the right of the court, but in some cases its duty, to express an
opinion on the facts. In Commonwealth v. Orr, 138 Pa. 283, the
5
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Supreme Court said: "We find in some instances the expression of a
decided opinion upon the facts, but in no case was there an interference
with the province of the jury. We have said in repeated instances that
it is not error for a judge to express his opinion upon the facts if done
fairly; nay, more, that it may be his duty to do so in some cases,
provided he does not give a binding direction or interfere with the
power of the jury." And in a murder case, Commonwealth v. Van
Horn, 188 Pa. 164, the same court said: "That a trial judge should
abstain from comments on the testimony in such a case as this could
not possibly be expected. It would be a violation of his plain duty if he
did."
This bill is an illustration of the way in which courts are rendered
ineffective in administering justice by unwise statutory interference with
details of pleading and practice. It is to be sincerely hoped that the
bill will fail of passage and that the Pennsylvania courts will not be
obliged to recede from the position they have taken as to the functions of
E. L.
the judge in trials.
THE MELBER TRIAL AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY.
The recent trial of Mrs. Melber at Albany, N. Y., for the murder
of her only child by the administration of carbolic acid calls attention
again to the subject of insanity as a defense in criminal trials. An
attempt was made to prove the defendant insane, although the evidence
offered for that purpose, according to the press accounts of the trial,
was very slight. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the second
degree and it is stated that the jurors subsequently said that they had
agreed upon that verdict, not because they were free from all doubt as
to the insanity of the defendant, but because it would not keep her from
the insane asylum if she be really demented, but would operate to prevent her confinement in such an institution with the chances of a discharge later on insanity proceedings.
A committee of the New York Bar Association has recommended a
change in the law as to insanity as a defense to crime which is formulated as follows:
"If upon the trial of any person accused of any offense it appears
to the jury upon the evidence that such person did the act charged, but
was at the time insane, so as not to be responsible for his actions, the
jury shall return a special verdict, 'guilty, but insane,' and thereupon
the court shall sentence such person to confinement in a state asylum
for the criminal insane for such term as he would have had to serve in
prison, but for the finding of insanity; and if upon the expiration of
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such term it shall appear to the court that such person is still insane,
his confinement in such asylum shall continue during his insanity; and,
further, when such a verdict of 'guilty, but insane,' is returned in a
case where the penalty for the verdict of guilty against a sane person
is death, such sentence for the insane person thus found guilty shall be
for life; and in, all such cases -the Governor shall have the power to
pardon, after such inquiry as he may see fit to institute upon the question whether it will be safe to the public to allow such person to go at
large."
There would seem to be obvious and conclusive objection to this
proposal. It recognizes that the defendant proved to be insane is not
responsible for his act, but requires a finding of guilt, which is, of
course, an affirmation that the person was responsible. It also requires
the imposition of the punishment of imprisonment for the same term
as a sane person would have to serve, the only difference being that
the place of confinement is an asylum instead of a prison. It would
be more consistent to say that he should be imprisoned the same as a
sane person, if he is to be punished at all. The purpose of an asylum
is restraint and treatment, not punishment. If the insane criminal has
really responded to treatment and recovered, what sort of logic or common sense is it that would keep him, perhaps for years afterward, shut
up in an asylum? Of course, the real trouble is the suspicion that
the criminal was not insane in the first place, but that assumes that
the verdict was wrong, and the problem to be met is, then, the securing
of correct results in trials, not the punishment of the insane. The
obvious way of meeting that problem would seem to be a stricter application of the rules of evidence in criminal trials. No evidence should
be admitted that has not an apparent probative value on the subject
under investigation. There are rules of evidence to this effect and they
should be strictly enforced. Of course, it sometimes happens that,
where the mental state of the defendant is involved in the issue, as in
questions of intent, deliberation and premeditation, which bear upon the
degree of the crime, evidence is admissible which would not properly
tend to show insanity. In such cases, however, -itshould be limited to

its legitimate purpose. The question of expert testimony and its
proper regulation is also of importance here. Of course, no person
acquitted of crime on the ground of insanity should be allowed to go at
large, but should be committed to an insane hospital for so long as he
continues insane. This is, however, provided for by existing law, although, perhaps, some improvement in such provisions is possible. To
hold an insane person, however, responsible for his crimes when he is
7
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not held responsible for his torts, his contracts or any, other actions, is
an inconsistency that the law should not be guilty of. The result of the
Melber trial would seem to indicate that juries can be trusted to
scrutinize carefully the defense of insanity.
E. L.
LEGAL PROCEDURE AND LEGISLATION.
There is much criticism of the procedure of our courts nowadays,
both in and out of the legal profession. It is alleged that too many
cases are decided on technical questions relating to procedure, instead of
on the merits of the case, and the complaint is often made that this is
due to the legal profession clinging to old forms which are outworn and
which should be simplified in accordance with the practical demands of
the time. This complaint, however, overlooks the fact that for many
years the legislatures of our several states have been regulating legal
procedure until there remains at the present time very little of the old
common law forms to which are attributed the evils of delay and overtechnicality. The common law rules, while in many instances overrefined and technical, nevertheless formed a logical and related system
based on general principles and with a well-defined aim. The reform
of common law pleading, unfortunately, did not stop at simplification
and the removal of over-technicality, but substituted arbitrary rules in
endless detail, based on no principle whatever. A long course of
judicial construction was the necessary consequence; but, to make matters worse, the legislatures have continued to pass "practice acts" at
every session changing the rules relating to some branch of procedure.
It is obvious that with this continual change going on numerous questions in regard to procedure inevitably arise. It is to this continual
legislative tinkering with the details of procedure that over-technicality
is due where it exists at present, rather than to any vestiges of the
refinements of common law pleading. It is a hopeful sign that this is
beginning to be recognized. In his presidential address at the last
annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association Senator Elihu
Root said:
"The original Field Code of Procedure of 1848 contained 391 sections and was comprised in 169 of the small, loosely printed pages of
the session laws of that time. The last edition of our present code at
which I have looked contains 3,384 sections, a large proportion of them
dealing with the most minute details. It is doubtless true that some
provisions of substantive law have found their way into this enormous
mass of statutory matter and that some special branches of procedure
are covered by the present code which were not included in the original

REFORM OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
code. Nevertheless, the comparison between the two statutes reveals
plainly the fact that for many years we have been pursuing the policy
of attempting to regulate by specific and minute statutory enactment
all the details of the process which, under a multitude of varying conditions, suitors may get their rights.
"Such a policy never ends. The attempt to cover, by express specific enactment, every conceivable contingency inevitably leads to continual discovery of new contingencies and unahticipated results requiring continual amendment and supplement. Whatever we do to our
code, so long as the present theory of legislation is followed the code
will continue to grow and the vast mass of specific and technical provisions will continue to increase. I submit to the judgment of the
profession that the method is wrong, the theory is wrong, and that the
true remedy is to sweep from our statute books the whole mass of
detailed provisions and substitute a simple practice act containing only
the necessary fundamental rules of procedure, leaving all the rest to the
rules of court. When that has been done the legislature should leave
our procedure alone."
The principles which should be fundamental to a system of procedure adapted to our substantive law and methods of trial are fairly
well known and have been developed by experience, but so chaotic has
been our procedure in this country of recent years, due to legislative
interference, that there may not at once be agreement as to them.
Whether or not the present craze for detailed legislation can be overcome
for some time in the future, the attempt to do so cannot too soon be
begun.
E. L.
AN IMPORTANT REFORM IN FEDERAL PROCEDURE.
In a previous issue of the JOUN&,AL attention was called to a bill
prepared by a committee of the American Bar Association, and endorsed
by that body, designed to diminish the abuse of reversals and otherwise improve the administration of justice in the federal courts. We
are glad to be able to say that the more important parts of this bill were
passed by Congress at the recent session and are liow law. The law provides that:
"No judgment shall be set aside, or reversed, or new trial granted,
by any court of the United States in any case, civil or criminal, on the
ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure,
unless, in the opinion of the court to which application is made, after an
examination of the entire cause, it shall appear that the error com9
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plained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of the parties.
The trial judge may in any case submit to the jury the issues of fact
arising upon the pleadings, reserving any question of law arising in the
case for subsequent argument and decision, and he and any court to
which the case shall thereafter be taken on writ of error shall have the
power to direct judgment to be entered either upon the verdict or upon
the point reserved, if conclusive, as its judgment upon such point
reserved may require."
This rule is now in force in a number of states, notably New York,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Kansas and Oklahoma,
and there is a widespread demand for its adoption in other states. NVow
that it has been made a rule of procedure for the federal courts, it is
to be hoped that the example set by the nation will be followed by all
the states. There seems to be no good reason why it should not be a
rule of procedure in every appellate court in the land. Some of the
instances of reversals for errors cited by the judiciary committee of the
House in its report recommending the passage of the bill seem almost
incredible and would not be tolerated anywhere outside the United
States.
As originally framed, the bill contained a provision forbidding the
issue of writs of error in criminal cases, except where a justice of the
Supreme Court should certify that there was probable cause for believing
that the defendant was unjustly convicted. But this section was not
passed. As it is, the judge has practically no discretion, but must allow
an appeal as a matter of course. Thus a criminal who has been convicted in a state court, and whose conviction has been affirmed by the
highest court of the state, may sue out a writ of error to the Supreme
Court of the United States alleging that a federal question is inyolved
and the court is bound to allow the writ, although it may be perfectly
clear that the purpose is merely to delay the infliction of a deserved
punishment. The rejected provision made it incumbent upon the appellant or plahitiff in error to satisfy a justice of the Supreme Court that
he had been unjustly convicted, otherwise the writ would be refused.
Still another' rejected provision was designed to diminish the abuse of
the writ of habeas corpus proceedings, except where a justice of the
Supreme Court was willing to certify that in his opinion there was
probable cause for believing that the petitioner was wtongfully deprived
of his liberty. A third provision, also rejected, allowed appeals and
writs of error to be taken from the -istrict courts to the circuit courts
of appeal in cases of conviction for infamous crime. Under the present
procedure writs of error in capital cases may be taken to the Supreme

THE FRAMING OF INDICTMENTS

Court, making it necesasry for this court, already over-burdened, to review nearly every capital case where there has been a conviction in a
district court. Had this provision been enacted, the decision of the
circuit court of appeals in capital casps would have been final, as it now
is in other criminal cases, and thus an important cause of delay in the
administration of justice would have been removed and the Supreme
Court relieved of the burden of reviewing criminal cases. Nevertheless, the most important provision of the bill was enacted into law and
the advocates of reform everywhere should be thankful that the nation
has made the rule of harmless error a part of its judicial procedure and
thus set an example which it is to be hoped the states will quickly
follow.
J.W.G.
COMMON SENSE IN THE FRAMING OF INDICTMENTS.
In the last issue of the JOURNAL we called attention to the need of
greater simplification in the preparation of indictments, and for purposes of comparison we printed the text of a typical American indictment and along with it the same indictment as it would be drawn in
England. An official of the attorney general's office of Canada calls
our attention to the fact that the form employed in the Dominion is
even more simple than that of England. The indictment in question,
he says, would in Canada read as follows:
The jurors of our Lord the King present that 3. F. G., on the sixth day of
August, one thousand nine hundred and eight, at the city of Winnipeg, in the
Province of Manitoba, murdered F. M.

The Canadians, it will be seen, have gone further than the English
and have abandoned the use of the words "feloniously, wilfully, and of.
his malice aforethought," for the obvious reason that the elements of
the crime of murder are sufficiently alleged in the word "murdered,"
and, hence, any further allegations are regarded as superfluous.
Commenting on the exhibit published in our last number, the NTew
York Tribune asks: "What wonder that justice is slow in America,
when all the trumpery of the Midde Ages is preserved in its practice ?"
In the same spirit the Rochester Herald dwells upon the crying need
for greater simplicity and more common sense in the formulation of
charges. "The phraseology now required in setting forth an offense,"
it says, "is so involved that it is seemingly next to impossible to draw
an indictment in which the reviewing courts, which employ a microscope in their inspection, cannot find a flaw which serves to undo a
great deal of painstaking effort on the part of the trial officers, sending it back to be done over again, to the probable advantage of a criminal whose deserts do not call for so much consideration." Be it said
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to the credit of the more candid members of the bar, they generally
admit that the excessive particularity now religiously 'required in most
of the states is unnecessary., and many of them are advocating a simpler
form. But with a few exceptions it has not been possible as yet to convince the legislatures, and our codes of procedure nearly everywhere
still require charges to be framed much as they were in England in the
time of the Tudors. There are, however, some notable exceptions, of
which Kansas is an example. The penal code of this state long ago
abolished the technical requirements of the common law indictment and
enacted that indictments and informations should be stated in simple
and concise language, without repetition. It is not considered necessary in Kansas for the indictment or information,to set forth every
element of the offense charged, but only so much as may be necessary
to give the defendant reasonable information concerning the nature of
the act to be proved and its identity. Nor may indictments be quashed
for clerical errors or immaterial flaws, such as the omission to allege
that grand jurors have been impaneled, sworn and charged; that the
act was done "with force and arms;" that it was committed "against
the peace and dignity of the state." and similar superfluities.
There is now pending before the legislature of Illinois a bill prepared in the state's attorney's office of Chicago which provides, among
other things, that indictments, informations and complaints shall be
stated in simple and concise language. Fictitious names are allowed to
be substituted by the grand jury for real names when the latter are
unknown, and if -during the course of the trial the real name is discovered it may be substituted without the necessity of starting the trial
anew. The place of the crime and the means by which it was committed need not be alleged unless it is an essential element of the crime.
The omission of the words "then and there," "traitorously," "feloniously,"
"burglariously," "wilfully," "maliciously," "negligently," "corruptly,"
"with force and arms," and other verbiage of the kind, shall not vitiate
an indictment unless such descriptions are a statutory element of the
crime charged. The conclusion, "contrary to the statute," in an indictment for felony shall be considered as an allegation that the act
was -done "feloniously." Indictments relating to forged instruments
need not enter into a full description of the offense, but may designate
it by the name by which it is commonly known. Likewise indictments
relative to the theft or embezzlement of any kind of money, obligation
or other security may employ the words "dollars," or "money," without
specifying particulars or entering into the long and verbose descriptions
now commonly employed. Nor need the value or price of stolen prop-
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erty be stated unless it is an essential element of the crime. An appendix to the bill contains 100 specimen forms of indictments for various
offenses, drawn in accordance with the principle of brevity and simplicity. The proposed form of indictment for murder, for example, is
as follows: "That A. B., on the ...... day of ............
, 19....,
of big malice aforethought, with a certain ax, did assault and beat
(shoot, stab, choke, poison, etc.) C. D. with intent to murder him, and
by said assault and beating (shooting, etc.) did kill and murder said
C. D." The general purpose of the bill is admirable. It is framed by
men who are actively engaged in the prosecution of criminals and who
know the shortcomings of the present system. The objects at which
it aims certainly should commend themselves to the legislature.
J.W. G.
THE CHURCH AND THE CRIME PROBLEM.

Recently there has been a remarkable awakening of popular interest
in the crime problem. This interest has found expression not only in
the discussion of measures for the prevention of crime and for dealing
with criminals in a more rational manner, but in organized movements
for the betterment of the criminal law and procedure. The flood of
discussion in the newspapers, popular magazines and law periodicals has
been quite unprecedented. Hardly any other topic has found a place on
the 'programs of so many different and unrelated organizations. Bar
associations, learned societies, scientific bodies, civic organizations and
even the labor unions have all taken a hand in the discussion of the
problem in some form or another. Lately religious bodies have begun
to join in the agitation for more effective methods of combating crime
and punishing criminals. For several years the State Baptist Convention of Georgia has had a standing committee on criminal law reform,
at the head of which is a distinguished member of the Atlanta bar. The
committee has taken its duty seriously and has presented two reports to
the convention, in both of which it dwells upon the increase of crime
in this country; the causes which, in its opinion, are responsible therefor, and the remedies which should be applied. We publish on another
page of the JOuRNAL a summary of the resolutions adopted by the convention at its recent annual meeting, in November last.
The activity of all these organizations affords further evidence of
the widespread dissatisfaction with the administration of the criminal
law in certain parts of this country. Their diagnoses of the causes are
not always correct, their criticisms of the criminal law and its machinery
of administration are not always just, nor are all the remedies which
they propose practicable or effective. But of one thing we are certain:
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:No such widespread discontent, no such outpouring of criticism, would
be possible were there not real causes for it. Some of the evils complained of, it will readily be granted, are wholly imaginary, but many
of them are real and cannot be ignored. We need the coperation of the
learned societies, the scientific bodies, the relig6s denominations and
all other organizations that are capable of aiding the cause, whether it
be in the inculcation of higher standards of respect for law, the diagnoses of causes, the collection of data bearing upon the conditions which
must be dealt with, the investigation of results obtained elsewhere, the
remedies to be applied, and so on. The bar associations in many states
are earnestly considering schemes of reform, and everywhere there is an
evident desire among the better class of lawyers to remove the cause of
the popular discontent. Intelligent and constructive couperation of all
organizations should, therefore, and doubtless will, be welcomed.
J. W. G.
TWO CALIFORNIA JURISTS ON LAW REFORM.
The JouRNAL has recently had the privilege of presenting to its
readers two admirable papers on law reform by two of the most distinguished jurists of California, Mr. Justice Sloss, of the Supreme Court,
and Judge Lawlor, of the Superior Court. The defects of our present
procedure and the remedies, as pointed out in these two papers, deserve
the thoughtful consideration of the bench and bar, to say nothing of the
legislatures, from whom much of the relief must come, if it comes at all.
Mr. Justice Sloss frankly admits that there is much force in the criticism that the entire scheme of procedure is too cumbersome and inadequate and that improvement may and should be had. In the second
place, he says, the objection that the law in its present condition gives
the accused too great an advantage as against the state is well founded.
In the third place, the 'delays with which prosecutions are disposed of
is an evil the seriousness of which cannot be over-estimated. Both he
and Judge Lawlor dwell upon the evil practice of reversing convictions
justly obtained, upon errors which do not affect the merits of issues.
Where there has been a painstaking and laborious trial of the facts
before a court and a jury, says Justice Sloss, and the result has been
the establishment of guilt, the entire proceeding has been reduced to a
futility if the judgment is reversed upon some ground which has no
direct relation to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. The practice of considering on appeal, says Judge Lawlor, virtually every question that is raised reduces the final authority of the trial court to a
minimum, involves voluminous records, delays justice and fosters lawlessness. The verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court
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constitute but the preliminary skirmish in the contest. Causes, he says,
are frequently reversed on points which have never been raised in the
trial court at all-a practice which is opposed to every rule of order and
common sense. And, what is the worst feature of it all, he adds,
reversals in the great majority of cases result in the defeat of justice.
Both jurists point out the evils resulting from the wide latitude of
appeal now allowed, and, though neither would abolish appeals, both
believe the privilege should be restricted to more reasonable limits or
properly safeguarded so as not to obstruct justice. When the guilt ol
the accused has been fairly established, says Judge Lawlor, the conviction should never be disturbed by a higher court except upon considerations of the gravest character. The accused is entitled to a, day in
court, not two days or three days, and when he has had his day, with
every presumption of innocence in his favor and with the benefit of
every reasonable doubt, he has had every right to which he is justly
entitled. The protection of the innocent is the prime aim of the criminal law, but it is also necessary to the protection of the innocent that
the guilty shall be punished.
Justice Sloss favors the adoption of the English rule which allows
the Court of Criminal Appeal to dismiss the appeal, notwithstanding
substantial errors have been committed by the trial court, if, upon an
examination of the entire record, the appellate court is satisfied that the
conviction was just and that the same result would have been reached
if the error had not been committed. Under the practice prevailing in
the United States, material error always works a reversal, even though
the appellate court may be clearly satisfied that there has been no miscarriage of justice.
Justice Sloss is also of the opinion that the higher courts should
be given power in criminal cases to review questions of fact as well as
of law, to the extent that it may be necessary to determine whether any
error of law has worked substantial injustice to the appellant. Both
jurists plead for the enlargement of the power of the judge in the conduct of the trial. Justice Sloss points out that in the English courts
and in the American federal courts the trial judge has the power to
sum up the evidence and comment on its weight to the jury, and that
the exercise of this power has not resulted in the return of verdicts
unwarranted by the facts. Judge Lawlor thinks the judge should have
more power to deal with litigants, witnesses and counsel. Under the
present practice, the authority of the court may be challenged at every
turn and exceptions taken to every act and word of the court which
does not meet the approval of counsel and client. This practice weakens
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the authority of the court, diminishes respect for it, and is often resorted
to for the purpose of destroying the effectiveness of the judge with the
jury. The court and the prosecuting attorney are on trial and the
proceeding is largely a contest over errors the results of which are
deplorable in the extreme.
Both judges condemn the present rule in regard to the qualifications of jurors. No man, says Judge Lawlor, who has formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to the jury
should be held disqualified if it appears that he can and will act favorably and impartially, provided such opinion is not founded upon a personal knowledge of facts material to the issue, or upon statements made
in the presence and hearing of the challenged person by one having or
claiming to have such personal knowledge. No man should be disqualifiled for jury service because he has read the newspapers or formed an
opinion upon hearsay evidence unless the opinion is so fixed that it
cannot be removed by evidence which leads to a different conclusion.
With the present facilities provided by-the press for discriminating information concerning the facts of crime, it is difficult to find a jury no
member of which has not formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused, especially in cases which have attracted widespread interest in the community. Under such circumstances the citizen cannot
keep abreast of the times without rendering himself ineligible to jury
service. In short, the more he informs himself the less likely is he able
to meet the requirements for sitting on the trial of cases. The present
rule is made use of by counsel, not to secure fair and intelligent jurors,
.but rather those who will meet the needs of the defendant's situation.
It "often leads to long delays in the starting of trials and constitutes one
of the greatest abuses in the administration of the criminal law. Moreover, the state should have the same number of peremptory challenges
as are allowed the defendant. Judge Lawlor thinks the numerous exemptions from jury duty should be limited and the exempt class confined to clergymen, doctors, druggists and lawyers. He also advocates
legislation making it a crime for any newspaper to attempt to corrupt
public opinion and thereby interfere with the impartial determination
of cases on their merits. The abuse of the rules of reasonable doubt,
moral certainty and presumption of innocence, he thinks, ought to be
reduced by legislation defining the elements of those facts.
Both jurists advocate the abolition of the unanimity requirement
for verdicts in all criminal cases except capital offenses. Mr. Justice
Sloss points out that in the trial of civil cases three-fourths of the jury
may render a verdict, and that there is no reason to believe that it
i6
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would not work satisfactorily in criminal cases. The great advantage
of such a rule would be that it would always insure a verdict, notwithstanding the opposition of a stubbbrn and corrupt juror. Judge Lawlor
also suggests that the double-jeopardy immunity be modified so that
the privilege will not apply to the case of a mistrial or 'the retrial of an
action. Under the present practice, he says, a person who is charged
with murder and convicted of manslaughter cannot be again tried for
murder, on the theory that the verdict for manslaughter was in legal
effect an acquittal of murder. Mr. Justice Sloss advocates a modification of the constitutional guarantee relating to the exemption of the
accused from testifying against himself. As the provision is now generally construed, it not only exempts the accused from being required
to testify in his own trial, but that his refusal or failure to do shall
not be considered by the jury as a circumstance tending to establish his
guilt. Such a theory, says Justice Sloss, is contrary to the common
experience in the ordinary affairs of life. Why, he asks, should not the
mental processes that influence thought and action in other relations
of life have weight in criminal trials? It is no abandonment of the
doctrine of presumed innocence to say that when the prosecution has
shown a state of facts which points to the guilt of the accused and those
facts are such that a denial or explanation of them by him would tend
to establish his innocence, his failure or refusal to make that denial
or give that explanation may be considered by the jury as an item of
evidence bearing upon the question to be decided.
In conclusion, Justice Sloss declares that the need of a more
rational and less technical administration of our criminal law has long
been apparent, and has now come to be regarded as imperative. To
those who have made the law their life study the community has a
right to look for guidance in the effort to find a way'to make that law
more effective.
J. W.-G.
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PROCEDURE COMPARED AGAIN.
A member of the Rochester (lN. Y.) bar, in the March number of
Case and Comment, takes issue with us on the proposition that the
English methods of administering justice are more efficient than those
prevailing in most parts of the United States. In the first place, hie
argues, "conditions in England are wholly different from those in this
couitry;" and then he proceeds to draw a comparison between the vast
differ6nce in the geographical areas of the two countries, overlookin
the fact that many of the stat~s, which "are the units for the adminigtration of justice in all'bat a comparativel few concerns, aie .n reality.
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much smaller than England. The argument, theiefore, that since England is a small and compactly settled country as compared with the
United States, the administration of justice is attended with fewer difficulties, does not strike us as being to the point. The geographical comparison should be made, not between England and the United States
as a whole, but between England and some particular American state,
in which case the advantage will be rather with us. In any case, we
are unable to see how geographical differences enter into the question
at all. It would be quite as illogical to argue that the superiority of
the system of municipal government in England over that of the United
States is due to the smaller extent of territory.
In the second place, it is argued that England has the advantage
of longer experience. Her courts were in existence centuries before
America was even discovered. In our opinion, the time has long ago
passed when the plea of infancy should be given any weight in such
arguments. There has been entirely too much of a disposition to attribute our faults and our backwardness in certain fields of endeavor to the
newness of the country. As a matter of fact, we have outdistanced England in our inventive genius, in our industrial and business methods
and in the success with which we organize and manage great industrial
enterprises. The experience of many centuries has not been necessary
to establish our primacy over England in these fields of activity. Yet
when proof is produced to show that we are behind England in our
general lack of respect for law and authority, in our lower standards
of political conduct and in the relative inefficiency of our methods of
administering the criminal law, the excuse commonly offered is our
comparative infancy and want of experience. The fact is our judicial
experience has extended over several hundred years, and we wonder how
much longer the infancy argument will be thrown in our faces.
Again, our critic tells us that "legal procedure suitable for a monarchy will not suit the needs of a republic." Why not, may we ask?
Everybody knows, or should know, that England is a monarchy only in
name. The English people are a free, liberty-loving people, exceedingly
jealous of their rights. In some respects-as, for example, in the extent of the suffrage-they are more democratic than many of our
American states. From them we inherited our system of law and procedure. Trial by jury and all the other safeguards for the protection
of the innocent are and have long been a part of their legal procedure.
They are the same people as ourselves in race, language and ideals.
Why, we ask again, is the judicial procedure which they have adopted
and which has given so much satisfaction to the English people, and
18
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which is admired by so many American jurists, unsuited to our conditions?
Our critic asserts that the rights of individuals, as well as those
of the community, are as fully protected in this country as anywhere in
the world. If this be true, what is the explanation for the widespread
discontent, both among laymen and lawyers, with the administration of
the criminal law?
Again, we are told that "nowhere else has a poor man so good an
opportunity to secure a vindication of his rights"; and he adds: "Our
appellate courts pass upon trivial claims at the request of litigants of
very limited means, and a person without means can prosecute or defend
an action as a poor person.' How can a person without means avail
himself of the privilege of appeal any more in this country than in
England? Counsel must be hired and the court expenses of taking an
appeal must be met here, as there. Those expenses, as everyone knows,
are much higher here than in England. President Taft has over and
over again pointed out the disadvantages under which the poor man
labors as compared with the wealthy litigant who is able to employ
shrewd and able counsel and meet the other expenses of taking appeals.
The actual inequalities between the rich and poor under our system are
set forth in a convincing article by 31r. Brandon in the last issue of
this JounNA ,.
The merits of English procedure have recently been made the
subject of an extended study by a committee of the American Institute
of Criminal Law and Criminology which spent four months in the
courts of England. Their report may be found in the November and
January numbers of this JOURxAL, and we believe it is a fair and accurate presentation of the facts. It is based on actual observations of a
large number of trials, both in the courts of London and the assizes,
and upon conversations with many of the leading judges and barristers.
Their conclusions are distinctly favorable to the English system, and we
believe it will convince most fair-minded members of the bench and bar
in this country.
J.W. G.
LAW REFORM IN CALIFORNIA.
During the past year the problem of criminal-law reform, and especially of criminal procedure, has apparently overshadowed all other
questions of public interest in California. And well it may; for we are
told that in certain parts of the state the administration of the criminal"
law has perilously nearly broken down. The state bar association, the
San Francisco bar association, as well as the bench, have been wrestling
with the problem of how to improve existing conditions. A number
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of civic organizations, like "tie'Commonwealth Olub of San 'Francisco,
have also been active and influential. Both political parties in their
last pltfornm's pledged themselves,' if successful, to enact legislation .to
make the administration of justice more sp6edy and certain. The
Jegislature at its recent session devoted much of its' time, to. a consideratiori of this question and enacted as many as eleven different statutes
changing the penal code, each'of which is designed to improve in some
particular.the existing procedure.. A constitutional amendment was also
submitted -to the voters providing that no judgment shall be set' aside,
or new trial 'granted, in any criminal case on the ground of misdirection
of the jury or the improper, admission- or rejection of- evidence; or for
error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, -after ai exafnination of the entire cause, including'the 'vidence, the court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of 'has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice. This amendment follows closely the provision of the recent
act of Congress f6rbidding reversals by the federal courts in such ciases,
and is substantially the' same 'as an'amendment adbpted by the voters of
Dregon last November.
Two other amendments to Ilie constitution were proposed: one to
Permit 'verdicts' in 'all except capital cases.to be returned by ten jurors,
and one permitting the court to comment on the failure of the accused
to -testify in his own behalf. 'Both, however, failed to 'receive 'the constitdtional majority reqiiired.'
Among the statutory changes made in the penal code may be mentioned the followihg:' An act permitting the amendment of indictments
by the distiict attorney when it can be done without prejudice. to the
substantial rights of the"defendant and provided the amendment does' not
change the offense charged; an act to facilitate, the selection of grand
jurors and 'to do, awgy with the evil of quashing-indictments because of
the -possible lack of qualifications by -grand jurors; an act'cornpellihg
acdoinplic'es to be;witnesses or & produce *papers, provided that 'the testimony-or.-papers shall not be used in any criminal prosecution- against
the person so testifying; an act giving the state the same number of
peremptory challenges. as, is allowed the accused (formerly he was altoid t~iceas 'many6) ; an act changing the method:of taking down testiionygiv6n'before the grand jury; an act relating to the arraignment
of the acdu ed; ana an 'at lroviding for'substitute judges in case of the
death "or disability' of the j'fdge before the termination of a trial. over
which lie. is presidifng.
' The: desiiabiliy.. 6f a 'number 'of the changes made -by-'this legislatirh-was tiointed '4t:by Jysti&: Sloss 6,hd. Jlidge: awlor-n their articlei
'
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recently published in this JOURNAL. Verily, the movement for a beter
criminal procedure is making encouraging progress. California is to be
congratulated on this auspicious beginning. We are gratified to be
informed that the JouRN . oF CRIMINAL Law AND CRIMINOLOGY
"has been of some material assistance in concentrating the sentiment
that has produced this legislation. '"
J. W. G.

